A Method for Classifying Offer Strategies Observed in an Electricity Market

The idea that large-scale generating units will operate at marginal cost when given the ability to offer their power for sale in a uniform price auction is at best wishful thinking. In fact, both real and experimental data show that the more uncertainty a supplier faces (e.g., load uncertainty, uncertainty of other suppliers, etc.), the more they will hedge their profits through higher than marginal cost offers and through withholding units if permitted. This makes predicting unit commitment and dispatch ahead of time difficult. This paper explores characteristics of software agents that were designed based on the outcome of human subject experiments on a uniform price auction with stochastic load. The agent behavior is compared to the behavior of the subjects. Both subject and agent behavior is classified based on the data. Differences and similarities are noted and explained. Based on the result of the simulation, a model was suggested to explain an offer submitted in deregulated markets based on double layer diffusion.