PowerWeb Testing of Various Auction Clearing Mechanisms for Electricity

One-sided Markets for Energy | Mount, Timothy | Thomas, Robert J. | Zimmerman, Ray D.
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Robert J. Thomas, Timothy D. Mount, Ray D. Zimmerman
IEEE PES Power Systems Conference and Exposition, 2004, Vol. 3, pp. 1624-1630, October 10-13, 2004.

Testing auction mechanisms using humans in a controlled environment provides an excellent and inexpensive means for evaluating their relative merits. This paper describes a framework for testing the efficacy of various supply-side auctions including one with price-responsive load and a soft-cap market. These are compared to a non-uniform price discriminative auction also inappropriately termed a ‚??pay-as-bid‚?Ě auction. Experimental evidence to date based on uniform price market testing has shown an ability of price responsive load to mitigate high volatility and average price.